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Abusive phenomena are commonplace in lan-
guage on the web. The scope of recogniz-
ing abusive language is broad, covering many
behaviours and forms of expression. This
work addresses automatic detection of abusive
language in Russian. The lexical, grammat-
ical and morphological diversity of Russian
language present potential difficulties for this
task, which is addressed using a variety of
machine learning approaches. We present a
dataset and baselines for this task.
1 Introduction
Unfortunately, hate speech and abusive language
are prevalent on the internet (Waseem and Hovy,
2016), often creating an aggressive environment for
users. This can include cyber-bullying or threats
towards individuals and groups. Reducing this con-
tent is difficult: it is harmful for humans to mod-
erate.1 Thus, there is a critical need for abusive
language recognition systems, which would help
social networks and forums filter abusive language.
Moreover, with platforms taking increased control
over which content to surface, automatic abuse
recognition is more important than ever.
One problem arises when the subjectivity of the
matter is considered. Abusive language is hard for
humans to recognize universally (Waseem, 2016).
This indicates that the collection and labeling of
data should be thorough and objective, which could
be reached through e.g. large-scale crowd-sourced
data annotation (Sabou et al., 2014).
NLP research in the area is nascent, with ex-
isting solutions oriented mostly towards English
language (Vidgen and Derczynski, 2020), which,
despite sometimes being mistakenly considered
as “universal” (Bender, 2019), is very different
1https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/12/21255870/facebook-
content-moderator-settlement-scola-ptsd-mental-health
grammatically and lexically from many languages,
especially those using non-Latin characters (e.g.
Russian, Japanese etc). This paper addresses abu-
sive language detection in Russian. One issue with
recognition of abusive language in Russian is the
limited number of sources of labeled data relative to
English (Andrusyak et al., 2018; Zueva et al., 2020;
Smetanin, 2020; Potapova and Gordeev, 2016).
Thus, the collection and labeling of data presents an
additional challenge, and we present both dataset
and models.
2 Abusive Language Definition
In this case, we use the OLID annotation defini-
tion of abusive language (Zampieri et al., 2019).
This covers profanity, and targeted and untargeted
insults and threats, against both groups and individ-
uals. Specifically, in accordance this scheme, we




We searched for publicly available datasets contain-
ing considerable amounts of abusive language.
Russian Troll Tweets is a repository consisting of
3 million tweets.2 This was filtered to only Cyrillic
texts. This data is not labeled, thus a subset of the
data was labeled manually for use in this research.
During labeling, the data turned out to contain sig-
nificantly less abusive language than expected. An
additional resource, the RuTweetCorp (Rubtsova,
2013), was also annotated for abusive language.
In search for sources rich in abusive language,
the “South Park” TV show was found. The Russian
subtitles for it embodied a high density of profanity,
hate-speech, racism, sexism, various examples of
2https://github.com/fivethirtyeight/russian-troll-tweets
ethnicity and nationality abuse. The subtitles from
more than four seasons of the series yielded many
instances of abusive language. This data, Russian
South Park (RSP), was annotated manually. Inter-
annotator agreement (IAA; computed with Cohen’s
Kappa) over the whole dataset is 0.68 among three
L13 Russian annotators.
To complement this, the Kaggle “Russian Lan-
guage Toxic Comments” dataset (RTC) was also
annotated. The dataset contains more than 14 000
labeled samples of hate speech. In Section 4, the
performance of models trained on RSP data will be
compared to that including RTC. More than 1500
samples are in the RSP dataset, and more than 15
000 samples are in total, adding the RTC data.
Figure 1: Dataset parts size and balance
Instances Tokens
Total Abusive 5 904 133 180Non-abusive 9 893 192 307
RSP Abusive 307 4 356Non-abusive 1 078 18 189
RTC Abusive 5 597 128 824Non-abusive 8 815 174 118
Table 1: Word & token distribution across RSP
As well as in many in situ abusive language re-
search, an abusive language lexicon was also con-
structed. The text data that was collected previously
contained a fair amount of such vocabulary, how-
ever, the dictionary should not be limited by the
dataset. HateBase (Tuckwood, 2017) contains only
17 abusive Russian words. VK, the largest social
network in Russia and CIS, has an abusive speech
filter dictionary published unofficially, containing
a large lexicon of abusive words.4 Another source
is russki-mat,5 an open dictionary of Russian curse
3I.e. as first language
4Common Knowledge Russian Tweets,
http://study.mokoron.com/
5http://www.russki-mat.net/home.php
words with proper explanations and examples of
usage. Overall, the multiple-source lexicon built
contains more than 700 unique terms. As can be
seen from Table 2, abuse-bearing sentences contain
four times more uppercased words and 25 times
more abusive words than non-abusive sentences.
Words mean deviation
Uppercase (abusive) 0.02 0.007
Profane (absuive) 0.05 0.003
Uppercase (non-abusive) 0.005 0.00019
Profane (non-abusive) 0.002 0.00005
(a) At sentence level
Words mean deviation
Uppercase (abusive) 0.02 0.0003
Profane (absuive) 0.03 0.0004
Uppercase (non-abusive) 0.006 1.84E-05
Profane (non-abusive) 0.003 3.80E-06
(b) Across the whole dataset




The stages of pre-processing are the following:
1. Balance the dataset. The initial dataset no-
hate/hate distribution is 1078/307 for the RSP
dataset and 8815/5597 for the RSP+RTC dataset.
The no-hate portion of the dataset is under-sampled
so that this proportion is consistent.
2. Strip URLs. Remove the links from texts.
3. Adjust platform-specific text. All Twitter
mentions, hashtags and retweet are shown by a set
of distinct symbols (# for hasthtag, @ for retweet).
These tags might hold information on whether the
tweet is targeted at a particular person or not.
4. Orthographic normalisation. Replace Rus-
sian ё and Ё to the corresponding е and Е. These
letters are mostly interchangeable in Russan lan-
guage, thus it is the standard preprocessing routine
when working with Russian text data.
5. Tokenization. Splitting the sentences into sep-
arate words and punctuation. The tokenization is
done with NLTK library’s word tokenize() method.
6. Lemmatize terms. Lemmatization is reduc-
ing the word into its normal form. In case of Rus-
sian language, most researchers prefer stemming
over lemmatization, however, if stemming is used,
the search for offensive words in sentences would
become intractable. The lemmatization is done
with pymorphy2 (Korobov, 2015) - a morpholog-
ical analyzer library specifically for Russian lan-
guage.
7. Remove stop words from the text. Such
words are common interjections, conjugations,
prepositions, that do not need to be seen as fea-
tures in the future modelling of the data.
8. TF-IDF vectorization. Turn the words into
frequency vectors for each sample.
9. Train-test split Randomly split the ready data
into train and test sets with 80/20 proportion.
4.2 Feature Extraction
Additional features beyond the text itself are in-
cluded. Since abusive or hateful comments are
anticipated to be also negative in sentiment, senti-
ment analysis is included. The sentiment was auto-
matically predicted for the RTC dataset, for which
a FastText (Bojanowski et al., 2017) embedding
induced over RuSentiment (Rogers et al., 2018)
was used, achieving F1 of 0.71, high for sentiment
classifiers for Russian.
Upper-casing full words is a popular tone-
indicating technique (Derczynski et al., 2015).
Since one cannot “shout” in the internet, the intent
of a higher-tone is expressed with upper-casing.
Therefore, the number of fully-uppercased words
is counted for each sample.
We also count the number of offensive words
(from our lexicon) contained in a sentence. This
feature is expected to be important, since abusive
language is often combined with profanity, though
this kind of sampling is not without bias (Vidgen
and Derczynski, 2020).
4.3 Baseline Results [no RTC data]
The baseline model is a binary Linear Support
Vector Classifier with default L2 loss and squared-
hinge loss. The model was chosen to be an SVC
because similar work for other languages suggest
that it can be effective for this type of task (Frisiani
et al., 2019).
The overall F1-score is up to 0.75, depending
on the seed and parameters. The F1-score on the
RSP+RTC Comments dataset is higher, up to 0.87,
again, depending on the seed and parameters (Fig-
ure 2). Analysing the incorrectly classified samples,
it turns out that the main difficulty the model has is
(a) with RTC data (b) no RTC data
Figure 2: Confusion matrixes of the baseline model
longer texts as well as texts containing swear words
that cannot be converted to initial form due to dis-
tortion through slang/word formation. An example
of this is the following:
В чем проблема? Деградируй до неандер-
тальца и х*ярь (heavily distorted slang)
п*дарасов (misspelling)
What is the problem? Degrade to a Neanderthal
level and kick those f*ggots
The following example is a stereotypical hate
speech sentence - it is all upper-cased, it uses abu-
sive words and contains numerous insults. The
baseline model recognizes it well:
КРЫМОТРЕД НАРУШАЕТ ПРАВИЛА
РАЗДЕЛА Т.К В НЕМ НЕТ ОБСУЖДЕ-
НИЯ ПОЛИТИКИ. СВОБОДНОЕ ОБ-
ЩЕНИЕ ЭТО В b. ЭТО ТОЖЕ СА-
МОЕ ЕСЛИ Я НА ДОСКЕ О ПОЛИТИ-
КЕ СОЗДАМ ТРЕД О ШЛ*ХАХ. ТАК
ЧТО У*БЫВАЙТЕ В Б ИЛИ НВР СО
СВОИМ ЧАТИКОМ ПРЕСТАРЕЛЫХ
Г*МОСЕКОВ!
CRIMEA THREAD VIOLATES THE RULES OF
THE FORUM BECAUSE THE RULES DOES
NOT ALLOW POLITICS DISCUSSION. THIS IS
THE SAME IF I START DISCUSSING SL*TS ON
A POLITICS FORUM. SO GET THE F*CK OUT
OF HERE AND GO TO ¡another forum¿ AND
TAKE YOUR WHOLE OLD F*GGOTS PARTY
WITH YOU!
4.4 Skip stopword exclusion
Although removing stop words from tokenized text
is common practice, leaving them in might yield
different results. This is the case here. The re-
sults are better on both datasets. F1-score over the
RTC+RSP dataset is 0.88 (Figure 3).
4.5 Without balancing the dataset
In this experiment, the datasets are not balanced,
thus the proportion of hate/no-hate is 1/2 in the
combined RTC+RSP dataset and 1/10 in the RSP.
As can be seen in Figure 4, true positives decrease
by a small amount and the false negatives have
risen up by a large margin, causing a decrease in
overall model performance.
(a) with RTC data (b) no RTC data
Figure 3: Improved recall and precision on both
datasets without stopword filtering
(a) with RTC data (b) no RTC data
Figure 4: Performance without giving balancing in-
stance weights
4.6 Deep Learning
Neural network-based approaches often show
promising results on various NLP tasks. In fact,
some of the best methods for hate-speech detection
in English are BERT, CNN, GRU/LSTM-based
techniques (Zampieri et al., 2020). We investigated
these methods over RSP.
Model F1 Recall Precision
RuBERT 0.85 0.86 0.84
mBERT 0.76 0.73 0.79
(a) BERT variant performance
(b) RuBERT (c) mBERT
Figure 5: Performance of BERT variations over the
combined dataset
4.6.1 RuBERT
RuBERT (Burtsev et al., 2018) is the original Bidi-
rectional Encoder Representations from Transform-
ers (Devlin et al., 2019) model but trained on Rus-
sian Wikipedia pages. The fine-tuning needed to
be made includes training the last, classifier layer
of the network. The results are promising, reach-
ing F1-score of 0.85 on the whole training dataset
(confusion matrix in Figure 5).
The model is able to correctly recognize the fol-
lowing sample as hate-speech:
Посмотрел Утомленных солнцем 2. И ока-
залось, что это хороший фильм, такая вы-
сокобюджетная артхаусятина, к которой
могут быть претензии только потому, что
сп*здили-распилили и вообще ТАК НЕ
БЫВАЕТ. Ну н*хуй этих критиков. Об-
зоры длиннее фильмов, петросянство ху-
же рашкокомедий, еб*нутая ненависть и
до*бки по мелочам.
Watched Burnt by the Sun 2. Turns out it’s a pretty
good movie, a high-budget arthouse-ish film, the
only downside possible is that most of the budget
has been corruptly-stolen and THE PLOT IS NOT
REALISTIC. F*ck those critics. The review texts
are longer than the movie itself, jokes are worse
than <humor in Russian-produced comedies>,
f*cked up hate and f*cking nagging about small
errors.
4.6.2 mBERT
mBERT is multilingual BERT (Devlin et al., 2019),
again trained on Wikipedia pages of over a hundred
languages, mainly of non-Latin alphabets. Rus-
sian is Cyrillic, thus the model has the potential
in Russian hate-speech recognition domain. The
fine-tuning is the same as for RuBERT.
The results (Figure 5) showed worse perfor-
mance than RuBERT, up to 0.76 F1-score. The
reason for the lower performance is probably in
the concept of generalisation of BERT to multiple
languages, as opposed to RuBERT, which is trained
exclusively on Russian language.
The following is an example of a sample which
has been incorrectly classified as no-hate with both
BERT-based models, as well as the baseline model:
Вонючий совковый скот прибежал и ноет.
А вот и сторонник демократии и свободы
слова закукарекал.
The stinking soviet cattle came running and whin-
ing. And here is the supporter of democracy and
freedom of speech starting to croak.
The sentence does not contain any especially
abusive vocabulary, but rather the words ”stink-
ing”, ”cattle”, ”croak” in this context (in relation to
people) are abusive.
4.7 Analysis
For the largest dataset of Russian abusive language
samples (RSP+RTC) and the LinearSVC model,
the best-case is 0.88. This is a good result for
such a simple model compared to typical results
in other languages (Zampieri et al., 2020). Our
suggestion is that the reason for such a good score
is the correct data preprocessing and, even more
importantly, feature selection.
Processing RTC+RSP RSP only
Base 0.86 0.75
No stopword removal 0.88 0.83
No dataset balancing 0.85 0.80
Table 3: Ablations over data processing steps, with
SVM classifier (F-scores)
RuBERT still struggles mainly with recogniz-
ing longer texts and texts with misspellings. An-
other barrier for this model in particular is when a
text contains many named entities, because word
representations might not contain entity surface
forms (Augenstein et al., 2017) or individual enti-
ties may not be representative of the typical context
of a given abusive language phenomena.
An example of the above-mentioned criteria is
the following long sentence with many named enti-
ties (NEs) and misspellings:
Сторонники бандеровцев (NE) (лева-
ков (NE), выступавших за бесклассовое
(misspelling) общество и борьбу с капита-
лизмом) и карлика-душителя котов Степа-
на Бандеры (NE), который, как известно,
боролся с расизмом, поддерживал Идель-
Урал (NE) и называл побратимами ислам-
ских борцов за свободу из Азербайджана
(NE), не пользуются симпатиями у правых
европейцев.
The mistakes made by mBERT are roughly a
superset of those made by RuBERT. This suggests
that information mBERT can gain from other lan-
guages is not particularly helpful for this task.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented data, models and experiments
for abusive language detection in Russian. By
choosing the right preprocessing techniques and
language-specific feature selection it is possible to
achieve state-of-the-art performance on par with
best-performing English language models, even
using a simple SVM model. This indicates that,
given sufficient diversity of data, abusive language
detection solutions can be rapidly developed for
new languages.




Bohdan Andrusyak, Mykhailo Rimel, and Roman Kern.
2018. Detection of abusive speech for mixed soci-
olects of Russian and Ukrainian Languages. In Pro-
ceedings of RASLAN, pages 77–84.
Isabelle Augenstein, Leon Derczynski, and Kalina
Bontcheva. 2017. Generalisation in named entity
recognition: A quantitative analysis. Computer
Speech & Language, 44:61–83.
Emily Bender. 2019. The #BenderRule: On Naming
the Languages We Study and Why It Matters. The
Gradient.
Emily M Bender and Batya Friedman. 2018. Data
statements for natural language processing: Toward
mitigating system bias and enabling better science.
Transactions of the Association for Computational
Linguistics, 6:587–604.
Piotr Bojanowski, Edouard Grave, Armand Joulin, and
Tomas Mikolov. 2017. Enriching word vectors with
subword information. Transactions of the Associa-
tion for Computational Linguistics, 5:135–146.
Mikhail Burtsev, Alexander Seliverstov, Rafael
Airapetyan, Mikhail Arkhipov, Dilyara Baymurz-
ina, Nickolay Bushkov, Olga Gureenkova, Taras
Khakhulin, Yurii Kuratov, Denis Kuznetsov, et al.
2018. DeepPavlov: Open-source library for dia-
logue systems. In Proceedings of ACL 2018, System
Demonstrations, pages 122–127.
Leon Derczynski, Diana Maynard, Giuseppe Rizzo,
Marieke Van Erp, Genevieve Gorrell, Raphaël
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A Data Statement
This appendix describes metadata for RSP, follow-
ing Bender and Friedman (2018).
A. Curation rationale The texts were taken
from the South Park TV series in order to gather a
corpus relatively rich in various forms of abusive
language.
B. Language variety Scripted Russian trans-
lated at high standard from US English. BCP47
ru-RU
C. Speaker demographic The text is tran-
scribed from words of Russian actors, mostly male,
portraying characters who are both adults and chil-
dren. The child characters (age eight) make up
most of the speech content. The scripts were origi-
nally written by two US males from Colorado, over
a period where they were aged 20-something to
40-something.
D. Annotator demographic Native Russian
speakers, male, twenties, university students.
E. Speech situation This is scripted TV speech;
it’s not know how much latitude the voice actors
were afforded over wording.
F. Text characteristics The content is deliber-
ately somewhat foul-mouthed and very informal;
political satire and social commentary are common
themes.
